Deferring to the Dead: A Uniquely American Approach to Providing for Posthumously Conceived Children by Shuler, Kayleigh S




KAYLEIGH S. SHULER* 
Deferring to the Dead: A Uniquely American 
Approach to Providing for Posthumously 
Conceived Children  
Introduction .............................................................................. 342 
I.  The Law and Technology: Legislatures Struggle to Keep 
Up with the Changing Composition of the Modern 
Family ............................................................................ 344 
A. Many U.S. States Have Failed to Update Their Laws 
to Account for the Fact that a Child May Be 
Posthumously Conceived ....................................... 346 
B. A Major Purpose Underlying U.S. Inheritance Law—
Ensuring a Decedent’s Intent if Fulfilled—Is 
Frustrated By This Failure...................................... 349 
II.  A Country’s Inerhitance Laws Can Be Understood 
Through Its Historical Context ...................................... 350 
A. The Primary Purpose of U.S. Inheritance Law Is to 
Ensure a Decedent’s Intent Is Fulfilled .................. 351 
B. The Primary Purpose of French Inheritance Law Is to 
Ensure Equality Among Inheritors and the Efficient 
Administration of the Decedent’s Estate ................ 355 
III.  The Purposes Underlying U.S. Inheritance Law Are Not 
Being Served Through States’ Current Approach to 
Posthumously Conceived Children and Inheritance ...... 357 
Conclusion ................................................................................ 361 
 
* J.D., University of Oregon School of Law, 2016. The author would like to thank 
Professor Caroline Forell for her support in developing the ideas presented herein, as well 
as Associate Editor R. Samuel Willette and the entire Oregon Review of International Law 
team for their invaluable critiques and improvements to this work. 
SHULER (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/2016  2:31 PM 
342 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17, 341 
INTRODUCTION 
Many people fail to carefully consider the manner in which they 
would like their wealth and valued possessions to be handled after 
death.1 Alternatively, but equally problematic, some people give 
significant thought to these matters, but fail to memorialize their wishes 
in a way the law recognizes.2 In either scenario, the state intervenes; it 
makes decisions for the person who has died and, more significantly, 
for the loved ones who remain. Its decisions are based on its intestacy 
law which govern distribution when a person dies without a 
testamentary instrument and which are designed to distribute assets in 
the way the legislature believes most people would want.3 The laws are 
meant to “fulfil[] the donative intent of the average intestate 
decedent.”4 Only if donative intent is fulfilled are the laws a success. 
Defining the wishes of the “average” intestate decedent is difficult, 
particularly in the relatively new but increasingly common scenario in 
which a decedent’s surviving partner gives birth to a posthumously 
(after death) conceived child. Posthumously conceived children are the 
result of careful family planning in which a family uses a combination 
of reproductive technologies to allow a mother to conceive a child after 
the child’s father has died.5 At present, intestacy laws throughout the 
United States approach this scenario in a variety of ways, with some 
states distributing a decedent’s assets to posthumously conceived 
children and some not. 
The greatest impact of intestacy laws governing posthumously 
conceived children is actually not felt when surviving families pursue 
 
1 Jennifer Seidman, Functional Families and Dysfunctional Laws: Committed Partners 
and Intestate Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 211 (2004). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 211. 
5 Id. For a technical discussion regarding the science behind various reproductive 
technologies, see Assisted Reproductive Technologies, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/infertility/conditioninfo/Pages 
/art.aspx (last visited May 12, 2015). 
 Although it is possible (when reproductive technology is coupled with surrogacy) for 
children to be conceived after their mother’s death, this paper will focus on the more 
common scenario of children conceived after their father’s death. A related situation is that 
of a frozen embryo, created by two parents who intentionally created the embryo but 
perished before the embryos were implanted and born. There is some argument that this 
child more closely qualifies as a child “in being” under intestacy statutes since it was 
conceived prior to the parent’s death, thus rendering this complication moot, but case law 
has not yet developed around this issue. This category of cases will also not be addressed in 
this paper. 
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a decedent’s home or tangible assets. Instead, families with 
posthumously conceived children are more likely to encounter these 
laws when they pursue the decedent’s Social Security survivor benefits. 
The Social Security Administration requires U.S. courts to turn to 
intestacy laws of the state when determining an applicant’s eligibility 
to receive Social Security benefits.6 Thus, a posthumously conceived 
child is eligible for benefits only if the child could inherit through the 
state’s intestacy law.7 Usually, whether the child could inherit through 
the state’s intestacy law depends on how the state defines a “child” 
within those laws and, more specifically, whether the state takes a 
position on whether posthumously conceived children fall within that 
definition.8 The lack of attention many states have given to the interplay 
between their intestacy laws and Social Security benefits is alarming. 
In this paper, I will conclude that the state legislatures should 
uniformly allow posthumously conceived children to inherit from their 
deceased parent which will, in turn, allow courts to extend Social 
Security and other benefits to these children. By comparing the 
purposes underlying U.S. inheritance law to the purposes underlying 
French inheritance law, I will demonstrate that uniform inheritance for 
these children is consistent with the U.S.’s approach throughout the 
intestacy system. I will argue that values like equality and efficient 
estate administration emphasized within French inheritance law—and 
often cited as reasons against allowing posthumously conceived 
children to inherit—are not as prevalent in U.S. inheritance law. 
Instead, under U.S. law, efficiency often gives way to ensuring a 
decedent’s intent is carried out. Legislatures must extend the American 
principles of intent-fulfillment to the context of granting inheritance 
rights to posthumously conceived children. 
Other scholars and legal advocates have also argued for change in 
U.S. intestacy law that would allow posthumously conceived children 
to inherit from the estate of their deceased parent.9 These scholars have 
 
6 ALBERTA L. REF. INST., REPORT NO. 23, SUCCESSION AND POSTHUMOUSLY 
CONCEIVED CHILDREN: REPORT FOR DISCUSSION 34 (2012). See, e.g., Woodward v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (2002); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (2000); 
Khabbaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d. 1180 (2007); Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 
Admin., 386 F.Supp. 2d 1257 (2005); Comm’r of Soc. Sec. v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 
(2012). 
7 ALBERTA L. REF. INST, supra note 6, at 34. 
8 Id. 
9 See, e.g., Julie Goodwin, Not All Children are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address 
Equal Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. 
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grounded their conclusions in alternative theories, including 
Constitutional arguments involving the Equal Protection Clause,10 or 
moral arguments based on ensuring the dignity of the deceased.11 My 
scholarship reaches the same conclusion, but by arguing from a 
historical and cultural perspective. In particular, I argue that allowing 
posthumously conceived children to inherit is consistent with the 
American approach to inheritance law and its emphasis on testamentary 
intent. In Part I, I will illustrate how the rights of a posthumously 
conceived child differ from those of a posthumously born child under 
current law, and I will explore the primary scenario in which American 
courts (both state and federal) have encountered these children’s 
claims. In Part II, I will explain the historical roots of both the 
American inheritance law system and the French inheritance law 
system and how those roots persist in each country’s modern law. 
Finally, in Part III, I will conclude that current law often fails to 
contemplate posthumously conceived children, thereby forcing courts 
to deny them rights in a way that is inconsistent with the rest of 
American inheritance law. 
I 
THE LAW AND TECHNOLOGY: LEGISLATURES STRUGGLE TO 
KEEP UP WITH THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE MODERN 
FAMILY 
The legislature’s goal when drafting intestacy law is to effectuate an 
average person’s intent, but it has been difficult for lawmakers to keep 
pace with all aspects of our complicated human lives. A hypothetical 
case is illustrative. Imagine a baby, Jane. Both of Jane’s parents were 
looking forward to Jane joining them and their other children in their 
home, but Jane’s father is tragically killed in a car accident while Jane 
 
INT. L.J., 234 (2005); Charles P. Kindregan, Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir from the Freezer, 
35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 433. 
10 See Goodwin, supra note 9. But see In re Estate of Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593, 599 
(2000) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to intestacy law where plaintiffs argued that 
denying inheritance rights to posthumously conceived children “invidiously and irrationality 
discriminate[s]” though finding for plaintiffs on other grounds). 
11 Devon D. Williams, Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare and Medical 
Phenomenon of Posthumous Conception Through Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, 34 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 200 (2011) (suggesting that legislatures should adopt a uniform set 
of rules, similar to the Wills Act, to address these issues; particularly when the posthumously 
conceived child will be produced not from preserved sperm, but from sperm retrieved from 
a man shortly after he dies). 
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is still in utero. As Jane will not be born for another seven months, her 
father will never have the chance to meet her. 
After his death, the assets from Jane’s father’s estate will be 
distributed. If he is like approximately half of the citizens of the United 
States, he will not have left a will explaining the way he wishes for his 
assets to be divided.12 Instead, the court will look to his state’s intestacy 
statutes to determine “who takes what” from his estate because, when 
a person does not leave a will, intestacy statutes serve as a default.13 
Note that, because they serve as a default, the statutes are designed to 
distribute a person’s estate the way most people would want it 
distributed—to “close family members.”14 In that aim, the Uniform 
Probate Code, a model for intestacy laws, provides thirteen different 
intestate distribution schemes;  the schemes account for different 
family structures and consider “the number of people surviving the 
decedent and the relationship of the survivors to the intestate 
decedent.”15 For example, when a person is married with children upon 
death, intestacy laws often dictate that the spouse, and sometimes the 
children, will take the estate.16 
Jane’s situation complicates this basic premise. She arguably does 
not fit neatly into the category of a “close family member” as she was 
not living outside of the womb at the time of her father’s death. But 
Jane is far from the first child to find herself in this situation. Sadly, 
many children have encountered the same tragedy. Fortunately for 
Jane, intestacy statutes contemplate children in this situation.17 In every 
state, Jane will be able to inherit from her father in the same amounts 
as her already-living siblings.18 Because the Social Security 
Administration requires U.S. courts to turn to intestacy laws when 
 
12 Sheryl Nance-Nash, Why More than Half of Americans Don’t Have Wills, 
DAILYFINANCE (Aug. 26, 2011, 3:05 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/08/26/what 
-america-thinks-about-estate-planning. 
13 Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 3 
(2000). The statutes are also consulted when a person drafts a will, but the will is deemed 
ineffective for some reason, perhaps because it was ineffectively executed or because it was 
fraudulently executed. 
14 Id. 
15 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-101 to 2-103 (amended 1993); Seidman, supra note 1, at 
223. 
16 See Gary, supra note 13, at 12. 
17 Posthumous Children, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 
VOLUME 7 – CONSULAR AFFAIRS, 7 FAM 1180, 1830 (2012). 
18 Goodwin, supra note 9. 
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determining an applicant’s eligibility to receive Social Security 
benefits, Jane should also be eligible to receive benefits though her 
father. 
To many, the outcome in Jane’s case likely feels like the logical one. 
After all, it seems like Jane’s father would have expressly manifested 
his desire for Jane to inherit from him had anyone asked (or, more 
specifically, had he drafted a will). If intestacy laws are designed to 
effectuate most decedents’ wishes, they should allow children like Jane 
to inherit. As far as U.S. courts are concerned, a case like Jane’s can be 
easily decided in the child’s favor using existing state statutes.19 But, 
as is often the case, advances in technology have further complicated 
the legal landscape surrounding these issues. 
A. Many U.S. States Have Failed to Update Their Laws to Account 
for the Fact that a Child May Be Posthumously Conceived  
Today, a child may be not only posthumously born, like Jane, but 
also posthumously conceived.20 That is, a child’s father may die before 
the child ever begins growing in the womb.21 Researchers have made 
tremendous strides in the area of reproductive technology such that 
now, with careful planning, a family may use a combination of 
reproductive technologies to allow a mother to conceive her partner’s 
child long after the partner has died.22 
Why would a family want to do this? Consider the example of 
Robert and Karen Capato.23 Shortly after Robert and Karen married in 
1999, Robert was diagnosed with esophageal cancer.24 Robert’s 
doctors warned the couple that Robert’s treatment might impair his 
ability to reproduce, so the couple chose to preserve some of Robert’s 
sperm.25 Still, they continued trying to conceive a child naturally, and 
they were successful.26 In 2001, Karen gave birth to their son.27 
 
19 Id. 
20 Mary Kate Zago, Second Class Children: The Intestate Inheritance Rights Denied to 
Posthumously Conceived Children and How Legislative Reform and Estate Planning 
Techniques Can Create Equality, LAW SCHOOL STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP, PAPER 609, 3 
(2014). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. For a technical discussion regarding the science behind various reproductive 
technologies, see U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, supra note 5. 
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Karen and Robert hoped to have another child, but in 2002 Robert 
passed away from his illness.28 After his death, Karen still wanted to 
provide her son with a sibling. So, Karen utilized the sperm she and her 
husband had preserved for this very reason.29 Karen used the preserved 
sperm and other reproductive technology to continue trying to have 
another child.30 In 2003, eighteen months after Robert’s death, Karen 
gave birth to twin girls.31 The twins were thus both posthumously 
conceived and posthumously born. 
Although Karen was thrilled at the miracle of her children’s birth, 
her joy was soon dampened by legal realties she had not considered. 
When Robert’s estate was being distributed, Karen encountered 
resistance in fulfilling what she contended were the girls’ inheritance 
rights—Social Security survivor benefits.32 The case moved through 
the judicial system, and eventually the Supreme Court of the United 
States was asked to determine the twins’ inheritance rights in 
Commissioner of Social Security v. Capato.33 Specifically, the Court 
considered whether the children qualified to receive Robert’s Social 
Security benefits under the Social Security Act.34 The Court’s analysis 
focused on state intestacy law in Florida, where Robert was domiciled, 
because the Act directed the Social Security Board to use state intestacy 
law to determine whether a benefit applicant qualified as a “child” of 
the insured.35 Ultimately, the twins were denied status as “children” 
under the Act because their posthumous conception placed them 
outside the scope of Florida intestacy law’s definition of “children.”36 
The most significant result of the court’s interpretation was that the 
twins, unlike their brother, were deemed to have no entitlement to 






32 As a result of cases like Shapira v. Union National Bank, 39 Ohio Misc. 28 (1974), a 
person generally has no constitutional right to inherit. However, a person does have a 
constitutional right to devise, as articulated in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). Karen 
Capato’s argument for her children was grounded not in the U.S. Constitution, but in her 
interpretation of her state’s intestacy law. 
33 Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 2024−25. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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Under Capato, it is clear that posthumously born children might be 
entitled to different rights depending on whether they were conceived 
before or after their father’s death. Thus, a state’s intestacy law will 
dictate a child’s right to inheritance in some cases, and her right to 
Social Security benefits in all cases. Today, states differ in their 
approach to the issue.38 Some states have considered the question, and 
determined that posthumously conceived children cannot inherit under 
intestacy law.39 Some allow posthumously conceived children to 
inherit, but only if certain conditions are met.40 States in this group 
might, for example, condition inheritance rights on the child being 
conceived within a certain time frame41 or on the mother providing a 
written promise that the decedent father approved of her use of the 
reproductive material.42 Perhaps most alarmingly, some states have yet 
to consider the question at all43 despite the undeniable impact on 
eligibility for Social Security benefits. 
One could speculate that, had he been asked, Robert Capato would 
have agreed that he would want any children his wife birthed from his 
preserved sperm to be entitled to full inheritance rights. Or, said another 
way, if Robert had amended his will before he died he likely would 
have provided for the twins.44 If intestacy laws are to serve as a default 
 
38 KATHERINE DWYER, Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children in 
Other States, OFFICE OF LEG. RESEARCH, REP. 2012-R-0319 (2012). 
39 Id. For example, in Oregon, posthumously conceived children cannot inherit because 
Oregon’s intestacy law on the matter, ORS 112.075, only extends to children who are in 
gestation when their father dies. See OR. REV. STAT. 112.075 (2016). The law was drafted 
in 1969, before the technology at issue was commonplace. 
40 Id. The states are California, Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, North Dakota, Texas, and 
Virginia. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 249.5(c) (West Supp. 2012); COLO. REV. 
STATE. ANN. § 15-11-120(11) (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.220(A)(1) (West Supp. 
2012); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19(11) 
(West 2009); TEX. FAM. CODE § 160.703; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(B). 
41 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 249.5(c) (2012) (allowing inheritance if child is in 
utero within two years of parent’s death); COLO. REV. STATE. ANN. § 15-11-120(11) (West 
2011) (in utero within three years or born within 45 months); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
633.220(A)(1) (West Supp. 2012) (born within two years); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) 
(West 2008) (born within three years); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-19(11) (West 
2009) (in utero within three years or born within forty-five months). 
42 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-704. 
43 Id. 
44 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2023 (2012). Robert Capato did 
execute a will. The will provided for Karen and their son, but was not amended in the 
roughly two years between his son’s birth and his own death, likely because of the 
progression of his illness. Regardless, the court would have used Florida’s intestacy law for 
the purpose of determining if the twins were entitled to Robert’s Social Security benefits, so 
the result would have been the same in terms of the benefits. 
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for what most people would want, and if it were demonstrated that most 
people would want their children conceived in this way to inherit, then 
state intestacy laws should reflect as much. Think back to Jane, the 
hypothetical child who was a developing fetus when her father died, 
and whom we determined was unequivocally entitled to inheritance 
rights under every state’s intestacy laws. If the rationale in Jane’s case 
had been applied by the Florida Legislature as it drafted its intestacy 
laws, and it had considered a family like the one in Capato, it might 
have defined its intestacy laws differently.  
So why did the Florida legislature, and the legislatures of other states 
with similar laws, not have the Capato family in mind? The simplest 
answer is that technology has outpaced the law as it relates to 
inheritance rights. As one scholar noted, “inheritance law, which at first 
seems to be a fortress of the legitimate family, appears on closer 
inspection to be more like a museum.”45 Scientific advancements, to 
say nothing of social norms, are evolving at a pace that can be difficult 
for anyone to respond to, let alone elected officials who must make 
rules according to slow, formal processes. 
B. A Major Purpose Underlying U.S. Inheritance Law—Ensuring a 
Decedent’s Intent if Fulfilled—Is Frustrated By This Failure 
The United States is not alone in needing to adapt to changing family 
structures.46 Among the countries confronting these issues, however, 
the United States is somewhat unique in its overall approach to 
inheritance law.47 In particular, the United States has consistently 
aimed to create an inheritance system that fulfills decedent’s wishes to 
the greatest extent possible. This unique approach provides the 
argument needed to expand rights to posthumously conceived children 
that might not be persuasive in other countries. Where the historical 
and cultural traditions of U.S. intestacy law are compared to those of 
France, it is obvious that one of the strongest rationales for modifying 
U.S. law to provide greater rights for posthumously conceived children 
is that a more inclusive law better purports with American inheritance 
system goals. We must use American principles of intent-fulfillment to 
 
45 MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND 
THE FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 289−90 (1989). 
46 Maya Sabatello, Posthumously Conceived Children: An International and Human 
Rights Perspective, 27 J. L. & HEALTH 29, 36 (2014). 
47 Adam J. Hirsch, American History of Inheritance Law, OXFORD INT’L ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF LEGAL HISTORY (2009). 
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urge state legislatures to make posthumously conceived children and 
their families a priority and to update state laws accordingly 
II 
A COUNTRY’S INERHITANCE LAWS CAN BE UNDERSTOOD 
THROUGH ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
The U.S.’s and France’s differing approaches to inheritance law can 
be explained by the fact that the bodies of law developed along very 
different cultural and historical paths. These paths led to a fundamental 
difference in thinking regarding the appropriate emphasis within 
inheritance laws. In the U.S. system today, legislatures emphasize 
ensuring that a person’s intent is carried out.48 In the French system 
today, the emphasis is on ensuring that a person’s estate can be 
efficiently administered by equally dividing assets between 
beneficiaries and then closed.49 While these two goals—effectuating 
intent and ensuring efficiency—may complement each other at times, 
they do not always do so. When defining the inheritance rights of 
posthumously conceived children, the purposes conflict,50 and 
lawmakers must decide which to give more weight. Although not a 
proponent of the position herself, Ellen Garside summarizes the 
argument that efficiency and fairness dictate that posthumously 
conceived children not inherit.51 She explains that “[a]llowing a child 
born some twenty years after the death of the gamete provider to claim 
his or her inheritance and force other heirs and legatees to reduce their 
inheritance will wreak havoc on stability of land titles” and fail to 
“protect the state’s interest in stable land titles and the orderly 
disposition of property.”52 In short, critics of allowing these children to 
inherit fear that both the state and other existing children will be left 
wondering about the security of their rights.53 Of course, as some state 
laws reflect, the twenty-year timeline Garside speaks of can easily be 
 
48 Id. 
49 Margaret H. Darrow, Revolution in the House: Family, Class, and Inheritance in 
Southern France, 1775-1825, PRINCETON LEGACY LIBRARY (1990). 
50 Rosalind Atherton, En ventre sa frigidaire: posthumous children in the succession 
context, 19 LEGAL STUD. 2, 139 (2006). 
51 Ellen Garside, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to the Dilemma of the 
Posthumously Conceived Child, 41 LOY. L. REV. 713, 730 (1996). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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shortened with legislation,54 but the concern about finality persists 
even, for example, during a two-year timeline. Granting posthumously 
conceived children inheritance rights is not the “tidy” result.55 Yet, as 
will be explained, it is the result most consistent with the rest of U.S. 
law, and U.S. lawmakers have often opted for less-tidy results when it 
means a decedent’s wishes are more likely to be fulfilled. 
A. The Primary Purpose of U.S. Inheritance Law Is to Ensure a 
Decedent’s Intent Is Fulfilled 
The primary purpose of U.S. inheritance law today is to “cure intent-
defeating formalism.”56 That purpose is not new. The history of 
American inheritance law can be conceptualized as existing within at 
least two periods: the colonial period through the nineteenth century 
and the twentieth century through modern day.57 When the periods are 
considered together, it is clear that “American inheritance law has 
always been, and remains, marked by a robust freedom of testation that 
distinguishes our law from that of modern Britain and other countries 
in the western world.”58 As American inheritance law was first derived 
from British law, the areas of departure are conspicuous.59 They are 
also purposeful.60 The periods are characterized by different legal 
developments in inheritance law, but a common theme unites the 
history: an emphasis on ensuring that the law does not interfere with a 
person’s ability to see her wishes carried out after her death. 
The first period in the development of American inheritance law is 
the colonial period.61 The colonial period was a time in which 
Americans quickly began making changes to the formal inheritance 
 
54 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 249.5(c) (West) (effective Jan. 1, 2006) (allowing 
inheritance if child is in utero within two years of parent’s death). 
55 Atherton, supra note 50, at 160. 
56 Seidman, supra note 1, at 220; see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, prefatory note 
(amended in 2008) (explaining the UPC drafters’ thinking behind the 1990 revisions to the 
Code which increased the share intestate spouses take from an estate by noting that, “[i]n 
the twenty or so years between the original promulgation of the Code [in 1969] and the 1990 
revisions, several developments occurred that prompted the systematic round of review” 
including “the decline of formalism in favor of intent-serving policies”). 
57 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 235−40. 
58 Id. at 235. 
59 George L. Haskins, The Beginnings of Partible Inheritance in the American Colonies, 
51 YALE L.J. 1280, 1296 (1942). 
60 Id. 
61 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 235. 
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system they brought with them from England62 under which, depending 
on a person’s social status, wealth, sex, and property, he might have 
limited or no control over the disposition of his property.63 The 
colonists rejected many of those English traditions.64 Instead, they 
“embraced freedom of testation from the beginning.”65 Most of the 
colonies largely eliminated restrictions on a person’s ability to dictate 
what would happen to his estate at death.66 For example, the colonists 
eliminated the rule of primogeniture that governed estate distribution 
in England under which the eldest son always inherited the family’s 
land at his father’s death.67 
In place of the British rules, the colonists adopted a new intestacy 
system that included drastic changes designed to effectuate a 
decedent’s intent. For example, the majority of colonies’ intestacy laws 
reflected the idea that, at a parent’s death, the parent’s property should 
be divided equally among the surviving children (instead of given 
entirely to the eldest son).68 Massachusetts, which had such a rule, also 
allowed the courts substantial discretion to modify the rule’s 
application as needed in specific cases.69 For example, the court could 
give a widow the majority of the estate if there were young, surviving 
children.70 This scheme represented such a “clear departure from the 
common law of England,” that it was, in one Massachusetts case, 
challenged as a violation of the colony’s charter, though it was 
eventually approved by royal authority.71 
Other changes also supported the goal of carrying out the decedent’s 
intent. In 1751, Virginia altered its laws to allow colonists to pass their 
estate using what are known as holographic wills.72 A holographic will 
 
62 Id. 
63 Carole Shammas, English Inheritance Law and its Transfer to the Colonies, 31. AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 145, 145 (1987). 
64 Id. 
65 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 235. 
66 Id. Two restrictions were preserved. The first dictated that a surviving spouse had to 
receive a certain percentage of a deceased spouse’s land, and the second restriction, placed 
on a person who had already inherited some property, allowed a deviser to limit his devisee’s 
ability to leave property to someone outside the family’s bloodline. 
67 Id. Rules of primogeniture dictate that an eldest son must inherit his family’s land at 
his father’s death. 
68 Id. 
69 Haskins, supra note 59, at 1296. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 1295. 
72 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 236. 
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is a will written by hand and not witnessed—two of the formal 
requirements of traditional wills.73 Relaxing formalities “allowed the 
courts to give effect to the deceased’s intent, insofar as that intent could 
be ascertained.”74 
The Revolutionary era continued the pattern of making many 
changes in inheritance law. The evolving cultural and political 
landscape of the American Revolution “freed American lawmakers to 
innovate at their pleasure,” and shaped the development of inheritance 
law.75 Thomas Jefferson and other revolutionary leaders commended 
the changes, believing that, to establish a republic, they “had to get rid 
of the system that consistently awarded power with power and aided in 
the unequal distribution of wealth.”76 With the focus shifting away 
from wealth concentration and on to a decedent’s intent, the states also 
relaxed limits on who could inherit from a decedent.77 The idea that 
children should inherit equally after the parent’s death (as opposed to 
the eldest son only) was spread to all states.78 Restrictions on devisees’ 
ability to leave property to someone outside of the family’s bloodline, 
a restriction retained during the colonial period, was abolished.79 
Finally, the holographic will, once common only in Virginia, spread to 
other states.80 
During the nineteenth century, changes to inheritance law slowed, at 
least in comparison to the rate at which it developed earlier.81 In fact, 
the most relevant development during this time period was not to the 
law of intestacy but to the law surrounding planned distributions.82 This 
 
73 Id. 
74 Haskins, supra note 59, at 1297. 
75 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 236. 
76 Meggie Orgain, Death Comes to Us All, But Through Inheritance, the Rich Can Get 
Richer: Inheritance and the Federal Estate Tax, 4 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 
173, 181 (2011). 
77 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 236. 
78 Id. In fact, even those states that had maintained that the eldest son should receive the 
largest portion of a parent’s estate adopted this more egalitarian rule during the revolutionary 
period. The states had previously cited religious doctrine to justify distributing the estate 
unequally, but these approaches were abandoned. 
79 Id. See also Shamas, supra note 46 (explaining that this change made particular sense 
in the American context where land was plentiful, but money (which could be used for 
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development was the advent of the trust.83 A trust allows its drafter to 
dictate which person can inherit from her, when that person can inherit 
from her, and how that person can use the inheritance once it is 
received.84 Thus, although this change effected only planned 
inheritance arrangements, the U.S. legislature’s selective adoption of 
trust law from Britain85 further indicates a commitment to ensuring a 
person’s intent can be fulfilled. 
Changing family dynamics during the latter half of the twentieth 
century led to the second sea change in intestacy law that continues to 
the present day. Adjustments in the law during this period have been 
largely designed to adapt to the evolving structure of American 
families.86 State legislatures recognized that American families were 
changing, and that current laws were no longer sufficient to account for 
things like multiple marriages.87 They “responded by enacting more 
complex intestacy statutes to interpret probable intent in blended-
family situations.”88 For example, most states have changed their 
intestacy laws to reflect the idea that a spouse should inherit the same 
amount from a deceased spouse in intestacy, regardless of whether the 
surviving spouse is the husband or wife.89 Additionally, most states 
have adjusted their intestacy laws to account for the fact that a couple 
might bring children to their marriage from a previous marriage,90 
might have adopted children, and might have non-marital children.91 
These types of changes are meant to ensure that all of the people most 
decedents would consider “family” will inherit through intestacy.92 
Although not the focus of this discussion, it is worth nothing that the 
parallel body of modern testamentary law also has several features that 
allow a testator to fulfill her intent. For example, in most states testators 
are free to disinherit their independent or dependent children, and these 
children cannot assert a forced right to part of the estate.93 Freedom to 
 
83 Dwyer, supra note 38, at 326. 
84 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 327. 
85 Id. at 326. 
86 Id. at 238. 
87 Seidman, supra note 1, at 220. 
88 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 238. 
89 Id. Previously, ideas about a woman’s ability to support herself after the death of her 
husband led to unequal distributions in this area. 
90 Id. 
91 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-103, 2-114; see Seidman, supra note 1, at 220. 
92 Seidman, supra note 1, at 220. 
93 See John H. Langbein, In Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. 
REV. 63 (1978). 
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disinherit leaves more assets for the testator to distribute in accord with 
her wishes. Further, if a testator’s will is challenged based on her 
mental capacity, in many states, a jury (not a single judge) will be asked 
to ascertain her intent.94 This ensures that a larger pool of people will 
consider what most accurately effectuates her intent.95 These laws 
reflect an overarching goal in inheritance law of giving a person the 
freedom to ensure her wishes are carried out after her death. 
The preceding features of U.S. intestacy law illustrate that 
legislatures have long intended to create a system where a decedent’s 
wishes can be fulfilled. As will be explored in the following section, 
French inheritance law is not founded on the same principles and 
instead places greater weight on other values. 
B. The Primary Purpose of French Inheritance Law Is to Ensure 
Equality Among Inheritors and the Efficient Administration of the 
Decedent’s Estate 
If the purpose of U.S. intestacy law is to “cure intent-defeating 
formalism,”96 then the purpose of French inheritance law is to cure 
inequality and inefficiency. The contrasted purposes should not be 
surprising; French inheritance law reflects the different context in 
which it was developed.97 In particular, the French Revolution affected 
the way the French conceptualize families and, in turn, how the country 
structures its inheritance laws.98 During the French Revolution, 
multiple aspects of French family law were reformed,99 including 
inheritance law.100 Encouraging families to model equality and 
selflessness was seen as crucial to reviving France.101 Legislators 
worked to “inject the principles of liberty and equality into family 
relationships in order to create a family appropriate to the new 
regime.”102 During the first four years of the Revolution, drastic 




96 Seidman, supra note 1. 
97 Darrow, supra note 49. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. Other changes included: legalizing divorce and adoption, extending property rights 
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restricting what a person might do with property.103 The law was 
changed to mandate that property of both a testator and an intestate 
decedent pass to his children in equal proportion.104 
The changes to inheritance law made during this time were not 
always welcomed.105 Some families manipulated the new system in an 
effort to ensure one person, usually the oldest son, received the bulk of 
his parent’s estate.106 This was especially true in Southern France, 
which previously allowed substantial discretion to testators.107 
Nevertheless, over time the legislative desire for equality within the 
family defeated any desire to fulfill a person’s wishes.108 
The Revolution’s effect on inheritance law persists today. Modern 
French law continues to strive for equality, but that purpose has now 
been joined by a desire for efficiency. As a result, France, like many 
European countries, places numerous restrictions on a person’s ability 
to exert control over property after death.109 
For example, one of the most prominent aspects of modern French 
inheritance law is its continued emphasis on ensuring a person’s 
property passes to her children. Under modern law, if a person dies 
without a will, her children receive all of her assets.110 If she is married, 
her spouse receives a life interest in the decedent’s property,111 but at 
her death the property passes to the children.112 The idea is equally 
pervasive in French testamentary law, where it shows up in the form of 
“forced heirship.”113 A person with children can freely dispose of only 
part of her land; the remaining portion is “reserved” for her children.114 








109 Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Inheritance Legal Systems and the Intergenerational Bond, 46 
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 495, 536 (2011). 
110 Legal Guide to French Succession Law and Inheritance Tax, AHSTONKCJ, 
http://www.clefrance.co.uk/index.php/thebuyingprocess/french-succession-law-and-inheri 
tance-tax#.V1YSPJErLIU  (last visited Feb. 1, 2015). 
111 Id. Alternatively, the spouse could chose to take one-fourth of the estate. The 
remaining three-fourths would pass to the children. 
112 Id. 
113 Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 109, at 535. 
114 Id. at 536. 
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from her inheritance.115 The portion of the land that the government 
will deem “reserved” depends on the number of children the person 
has.116 In this way, an estate can be neatly proportioned and concluded. 
As these features of French inheritance law demonstrate, lawmakers 
prioritize efficiency and equality over other concerns when drafting 
inheritance law. 
III 
THE PURPOSES UNDERLYING U.S. INHERITANCE LAW ARE NOT 
BEING SERVED THROUGH STATES’ CURRENT APPROACH TO 
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN AND INHERITANCE  
Despite some of the significant changes in U.S. inheritance law 
discussed throughout Part II of this paper, it is important to keep in 
mind that the described changes occurred over hundreds of years. The 
reality is that legislatures typically do not make inheritance laws a 
priority when updating existing law or drafting new law.117 When this 
reality is coupled with rapid changes in technology, a problem emerges. 
The Woodward case, arising out of Massachusetts, provides a clear 
example of the challenge that arises when technology outpaces the 
legislature’s ability or desire to change laws.118 When tasked with 
determining the inheritance rights of a posthumously conceived child, 
the Woodward court found no modern law on the books to guide it.119 
Instead, that court was forced to try to stretch existing intestacy laws to 
the situation before it.120 Although the case was heard in 2002, the court 
was forced to apply a statute from 1836.121 Surely, the 1836 
Massachusetts legislature did not contemplate the fact that a child could 
be created from preserved sperm and in vitro fertilization years after its 
parent had deceased.122 Still, the antiquated statute was the only law 
 
115 See Miranda Ingram, Property in France: Keep it in la famille Now and for Ever, THE 
TELEGRAPH (Aug. 30, 2008, 12:01 AM) for one French lawyer’s advice on drafting around 
these laws to exclude children, noting that it is “virtually impossible” to do so. 
116 Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 109, at 535. 
117 Consider Oregon, which last overhauled its intestacy law structure in 1969. It is only 
revisiting the laws now, fifty years later. See S.B. 379 (27)(4), 2015 Gen. Assemb. (Or. 
2015) (considering expressly providing for children conceived after decedent’s death). 
118 Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (2002). 
119 Id. 
120 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 240. 
121 See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264. 
122 Consider, again, Oregon, a state that revised its statutes in 1969. Although, relative to 
the statute at issue in Woodward, this statute was written recently; even the 1969 statute was 
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available. The court was thus left applying legislation created for 
“yesterday’s technologies and yesterday’s questions.”123 
An examination of U.S. case law demonstrates that the issues 
presented by Woodward and Capato are not isolated events. The courts 
have repeatedly been asked to tackle these issues with little legislative 
guidance. Judge Stanton of New Jersey’s Superior Court voiced his 
frustration with this issue in the 2000 case In re Estate of William J. 
Kolacy: 
 I think it would be helpful for the legislature to deal with these 
kinds of issues. In the meanwhile, life goes on, and people come into 
the courts seeking redress for present problems. We judges cannot 
simply put those problems on hold in the hope that someday (which 
may never come) the Legislature will deal with the problem in 
question. Simple justice requires us to do the best we can with the 
statutory law presently available.124 
The facts of Kolacy, which prompted those comments, are 
remarkably similar to those of Capato. In both, a married couple 
decided to preserve sperm after the husband received a life-threatening 
diagnosis and was told the treatment might make him infertile.125 Also 
in both, a mother gave birth to twin girls eighteen months after her 
husband’s death, and, in both, the children were denied Social Security 
benefits.126 Finally, as in Capato, to determine whether the children 
were eligible for benefits, the court turned to state intestacy law and, 
more specifically, the law’s definition of “children.”127 Judge Stanton 
squarely acknowledged the problem the court faced in applying the 
law,128 
 The simple fact is that when the legislature adopted N.J.S.A. 3B: 
5-8 it was not giving any thought whatever to the kind of problem we 
have in this case. To the extent that there was a conscious legislative 
intent about reproductive processes involved, the intent was 
undoubtedly to deal fairly and sensibly with children resulting from 
 
written well before the technology discussed in this paper was commonplace. Thus, under 
ORS 112.075, inheritance rights currently only extend to children who are in gestation when 
their father dies. 
123 Shammas, supra note 63, at 146. 
124 In re Estate of Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593, 602 (2000). 
125 Id. at 596. 
126 Id. at 596−97. 
127 Id. 
128 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:5-8 (West) (effective Feb. 27, 2005) reads, “an individual in 
gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours 
or more after birth.” The State argued that the statute simply did not address posthumously 
conceived children, so it would be inappropriate for the court to apply the law to them. 
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traditional sexual activity in which a man directly deposits sperm into 
the body of a woman . . . The New Jersey Legislature has never 
addressed the problems posed in estate law by current human 
reproductive technology.129 
Reasoning that one underlying purpose of inheritance law is to allow 
children to inherit from their parents, the Kolacy court concluded that 
the twins should inherit under the statute.130 This analysis was unique 
in expressing firm, decedent-intent based arguments in favor of 
posthumously conceived children. 
Not all courts have adopted the same type of intent-fulfillment 
approach to deciding these cases. Like in Capato, the United States 
District Court in Florida denied inheritance rights to a posthumously 
conceived child in Stephen v. Commissioner of United States.131 The 
child in Stephen was born after his mother underwent in vitro 
fertilization, but the sperm had not been intentionally preserved for that 
purpose.132 Instead, the mother had extracted sperm from her husband 
immediately after his death.133 Approximately three years after the 
father’s death, the child was born.134 He was denied Social Security 
benefits.135 In addition to the slightly different factual circumstances, 
this case was also unique from the others discussed in that the court 
was able to turn to a law actually addressing posthumously conceived 
children specifically.136 The law expressly mandated that a child 
conceived after his father died was not eligible for a claim against the 
father’s estate unless the father provided for that child in a will.137 In 
affirming the Social Security Administration’s benefit denial, the court 
acknowledged that “no one would deny that Robert is a ‘child’ in the 
ordinary sense of the word” or that “Robert is the genetic child of Gar 
 
129 In re Estate of Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593, 600 (2000). 
130 Id. at 602. The court did not directly address the subsequent question of whether the 
children were therefore entitled to Social Security benefits. Plaintiffs merely sought a 
declaration of rights by the New Jersey court. They were pursuing the benefits action within 
the Social Security Administration’s appellate process. 
131 Stephen v. Comm’r of United States, 386 F Supp. 2d 1257 (Dist. Ct. Fla. 2005). 
132 Id. at 1258. 
133 Id. Mr. Gar Stephen died of a sudden heart attack. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (West 1993). 
137 Id. The court explained further that even if Mr. Stephens had left a will, the outcome 
of the case would still be uncertain unless he clearly defined “child” within the will. See In 
re Estate of Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593, 599 (2000). 
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Stephen.”138 Despite the fact that the child’s existence met the common 
sense and scientific definition of a child, the court reasoned that the 
child fell outside the statutory definition because of the timing of his 
conception.139 
In 2007, a New Hampshire court in Khabbaz v. Commissioner of 
Social Security Administration also determined that a posthumously 
conceived child could not inherit.140 As in the other cases, Mr. Khabbaz 
began preserving sperm when he received a diagnosis of a terminal 
illness.141 However, unlike in Capato, Woodward, Stephen, or Kolacy, 
Mr. Khabbaz took further precaution; he executed a consent form 
stating that he intended for his wife to use the sperm and that it was his 
“desire and intent to be legally recognized as the father of the child to 
the fullest extent allowable by the law.”142 Approximately two years 
after Mr. Khabbaz’s death, his wife gave birth.143 The child was denied 
Social Security benefits.144 New Hampshire law145 dictates that an 
intestate estate pass to the decedent’s “surviving issue,”146 and the court 
reasoned that the plain meaning of “surviving” requires that the person 
be alive or in existence at the time of the decedent’s death.147 The child 
did not meet that definition.148 The court distinguished its holding from 
Woodward149 by noting that, unlike the Massachusetts statute at issue 
in Woodward, the legislative scheme in New Hampshire evinced an 
express intent to only provide for those that “survive” and that allowing 
posthumously conceived children to inherit would contradict that 
purpose.150 
As the case law illustrates, courts have repeatedly struggled with the 
inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children, most often in 
the context of determining eligibility for Social Security benefits. 
 
138 Stephen v. Comm’r of United States, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (Dist. Ct. Fla. 2005). 
139 Id. 





145 RSA 5611:1 reads “to the surviving issue of the decedent equally” (emphasis added). 
146 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 561:1 reads “to the surviving issue of the decedent equally” 
(emphasis added). 
147 Id. 
148 Khabbaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 930 A.2d 1180, 1184 (N.H. 2007). 
149 Id. at 1186. 
150 Id. at 1184. The court apparently did not find Mr. Khabbaz’s written consent relevant; 
the opinion did not address Mr. Khabbaz’s express, written intent. 
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Often, the courts’ analyses conclude by denying the children rights. 
When courts do extend rights to the children, they acknowledge that 
they are only able to do so by stretching existing statutes.151 This state 
of the law is inconsistent with the rest of U.S. inheritance law. The 
inconsistency can be largely explained by the rapid pace at which 
technology has changed the shape of American families, but the 
legislature has responded to changes in the family before.152 When they 
choose to do so again, the practice of focusing on a decedent’s intent 
should continue. 
CONCLUSION 
The distinctive cultural and political development of the United 
States has provoked a unique approach to inheritance law that focuses 
on effectuating a decedent’s intent. The trend began when the colonists 
chose to break from the British, and it continues today.153 The 
persistence of this deference within U.S. law is made even more clear 
by contrasting U.S. law with a foreign body of law, like that of France. 
Unlike French law, which emphasizes finality and equality, U.S. law 
consistently favors carrying out decedents’ intent. Unfortunately, not 
all states have applied this approach to their inheritance laws effecting 
posthumously conceived children.  
As the numerous cases addressing Social Security benefit eligibility 
demonstrate, this is an active area of the law in which the courts need 
instruction. When addressing this problem by defining the rights of 
posthumously conceived children, legislatures will no doubt consider 
the competing goals of achieving efficiency and equality with that of 
effectuating intent.154 They should remember that, if inefficiency is the 
downside of allowing posthumously conceived children to inherit, then 
fulfilling a decedent’s intent is the benefit, which is the persistent goal 
of U.S. inheritance law. Further, given that people tend to harbor 
similar attitudes regarding estate distribution regardless of their age, 
 
151 See, e.g., Gillet-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that two 
posthumously conceived children were entitled to survivor benefits because Arizona 
intestacy law did not expressly answer the question, allowing the court to base its decision 
solely on whether the children were “legitimate”). 
152 Hirsch, supra note 47, at 242-43. 
153 Id. 
154 Atherton, supra note 50. 
SHULER (DO NOT DELETE) 7/21/2016  2:31 PM 
362 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 17, 341 
education, occupation, income, or even wealth,155 intestacy laws could 
easily be modified to better effectuate people’s wishes by including 
some inheritance rights for posthumously conceived children.156 The 
ideal law will maximize the likelihood of fulfilling a decedent’s intent 
by presuming that a father who has frozen genetic material intends for 
children born from it to inherit from him, and will only allow that 
presumption to be overcome with contrary evidence.157 
As the law evolves, there will undoubtedly be questions to answer: 
How much time can elapse between a father’s death and a child’s birth 
before the inheritance right extinguishes? What are the in-being 
children to do in the meantime? Should there be a legal difference 
between children born from before-death intentionally preserved sperm 
and those born from sperm extracted after death? Although these 
questions are challenging, the case law demonstrates that simply 
ignoring them is an ineffective approach. Legislatures must accept the 
realities of changing technologies, and then work toward managing 
those realities. When American lawmakers take on this task, they 
should begin by considering what has always been at the heart of 
American intestacy law: effectuating a decedent’s intent, even at the 
expense of efficiency. With these enduring values in mind, lawmakers 
should expressly extend intestacy inheritance rights to posthumously 
conceived children, thereby ensuring eligibility for Social Security 
survivor benefits for these unique children. 
 
 
155 Mary Louis Fallows, Rita J. Simon & William Rau, Public Attitudes About Property 
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 3 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 319, 390 (1978). 
156 Changes to intestacy law based on public sentiment are not unprecedented. For 
example, the Uniform Probate Code (the national model for intestacy law) was revised in 
1990 to reflect survey data indicating most spouses preferred that their spouse take most of 
or all of the estate (revised to increase spousal share). See Seidman, supra note 1, at 220. 
157 Atherton, supra note 50, at 164. For example, if a father directed that sperm be 
destroyed at his death, the presumption would likely be rebutted. 
